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http://www.jstor.orgWHY THE LEGAL  SYSTEM  IS LESS  EFFICIENT 
THAN THE INCOME  TAX 
IN REDISTRIBUTING INCOME 
LOUIS KAPLOW  and STEVEN  SHAVELL* 
IN  economic  analysis  of law, normative judgments about legal rules are 
usually  based  on the rules'  efficiency,  regardless of their effects  on the 
distribution of income. As a consequence,  the economic  approach is often 
criticized.  Such  criticism  would  be  moot  if  the  income  tax  system- 
understood here to include possible transfer payments to the poor-could 
be used freely to achieve  any desired distribution of income.  But income 
taxes  and transfer payments  distort incentives  to work,  limiting the de- 
gree to which it is socially  desirable to employ the income tax system  to 
redistribute  income.  The  question  therefore  arises  whether  legal  rules1 
should be used  to take up some  of the slack and promote distributional 
objectives,2  even  if at a sacrifice to efficiency. 
In this  article,  we  develop  the  argument that redistribution  through 
legal  rules  offers  no  advantage  over  redistribution through the  income 
tax system  and typically  is less  efficient.3 The reason is that using legal 
* Professors, Harvard  Law School, and Research  Associates, the National Bureau  of 
Economic Research. We are grateful  for comments from Jennifer  Arlen, Reuven Avi- 
Yonah, David Charny,  A. Mitchell  Polinsky,  Alvin Warren,  and  participants  in a workshop 
at Georgetown  University  Law Center. 
l For purposes  of this article,  the term "legal  rules" refers  to rules other  than  those that 
define the income tax and welfare  system. 
2 Our discussion concerns the overall distribution  of income or wealth, not entitlement 
to payment  based on desert. 
3 The first model establishing  this point is in Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency  vs. 
Distributional  Equity  in Legal  Rulemaking:  Should  Distributional  Equity  Matter  Given  Opti- 
mal  Income  Taxation?  71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414  (1981).  A related  argument  is made  in Aanund 
Hylland & Richard  Zeckhauser,  Distributional  Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not 
Program  Choice or Design, 81 Scand. J. Econ. 264 (1979). (For extensions and further 
applications,  see Louis Kaplow,  Should  the Government's  Allocation  Branch  Be Concerned 
about the Distortionary  Cost of Taxation  and Distributive  Effects? (Discussion  Paper  No. 
137, Harvard  Law School Program  in Law and Economics 1993).) 
It does not appear, however, that the point is understood  in legal academia. See, for 
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rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives  fully as much as the 
income tax system-because  the distortion is caused by the redistribution 
itself--and  also  creates  inefficiencies  in the  activities  regulated by  the 
legal rules. 
To  illustrate,  suppose  that high-income  individuals  are subject  to  an 
income  tax of 30 percent and that, in principle, further redistribution to 
the poor would be desirable. Would we want to adopt an inefficient legal 
rule because  it redistributes an additional  1 percent of high earners'  in- 
come  to the poor? Under such a regime, high-earning individuals would 
surrender  31  percent  of  each  additional  dollar  of  income:  30  percent 
would go to the tax authority, and 1 percent would be taken by the legal 
system.  Now  assume,  instead,  that an efficient legal rule is retained and 
the income  tax rate for high earners is raised to  31 percent.  Then they 
would  be in the same position  and would be induced to work the  same 
amount as under the inefficient regime. (The increase in the tax rate from 
30 to  31 percent  does  not reduce  their incentive  to  work  because  it is 
offset  by  the  1 percent  decrease  in the implicit tax that was  associated 
with the inefficient legal rule.) The added tax revenue  could be given to 
the poor, just  as under the regime with the inefficient legal rule. Hence, 
redistribution using the 31 percent income tax and the efficient legal rule 
differs in only one  respect  from redistribution using the inefficient  legal 
rule with  the  30 percent  income  tax:  because  redistribution  is  accom- 
plished  in  the  presence  of  an efficient  legal  rule,  resources  would,  by 
definition,  be  saved.  With this  savings,  all  individuals  could  be  made 
better off (for example,  by reducing taxes and increasing payments to the 
poor). 
example, Guido  Calabresi,  The Pointlessness  of Pareto:  Carrying  Coase Further,  100  Yale 
L. J. 1211, 1224  n.36 (1991)  ("far from obvious that, as a general  matter,  tax and welfare 
programs  are more efficient  than a mixture  of these and of other rules of law"); Duncan 
Kennedy, Distributive  and Paternalist  Motives in Contract  and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory  Terms and Unequal Bargaining  Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 
613 (1982)  (inefficiencies  from compulsory  terms and from redistribution  through  taxation 
"involve exactly the same kinds of waste," leaving a difficult  empirical  question as to 
which is preferable);  Anthony  T. Kronman,  Contract  Law and  Distributive  Justice, 89 Yale 
L. J. 472, 508  (1980)  (because  taxation  and  contractual  regulation  both have efficiency  costs, 
determining  the preferable  means  of redistribution  raises an empirical  question  that "must 
be resolved on a case-by-case  basis, in the light of detailed  information  about  the circum- 
stances likely to influence  the effectiveness  of each method  of redistribution").  In addition, 
Jennifer  Arlen  does not take into account  the existence of the income  tax system in arguing 
that legal rules should reflect parties' wealth. See Jennifer  H. Arlen, Should  Defendants' 
Wealth  Matter?  21 J. Legal Stud. 413 (1992)  (discussed  in note 14  infra); see also id. at 428 
(noting that basing liability  on defendants'  wealth would affect incentives to accumulate 
wealth, but claiming  that "no matter  what  the outcome  of [further  analysis  of the issue], it 
is clear that the conventional  analysis ...  is not theoretically  sound"). EFFICIENCY  IN REDISTRIBUTION  669 
More  generally,  we  show  that,  even  though  the  income  tax  distorts 
work incentives,  any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced 
by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system 
designed  so that every person is made better off. In Section I, we present 
the analysis  leading to this conclusion.  In Section  II, we  discuss  briefly 
the general  role  of  legal  rules  in redistribution and when,  if ever,  it is 
efficient for legal rules to take into account parties' wealth. 
I.  ANALYSIS 
We provide  here  an informal demonstration  of  our result: given  any 
regime with an inefficient legal rule (notably, one intended to help achieve 
a redistributive goal), there exists  an alternative regime with an efficient 
legal rule and a modified income  tax system  in which all individuals are 
better off. For concreteness,  we will use a specific example in our analy- 
sis, but it will be clear that our argument does not depend on the particu- 
lars of the example.  (For a formal proof, and discussion  of certain quali- 
fications,  see  the Appendix.) 
Suppose  that individuals  engage  in an activity  that may  cause  acci- 
dents, the likelihood of which may be reduced by potential injurers' exer- 
cise  of  care.  It  is  a familiar result  that the  strict liability  rule-under 
which individuals pay for the harm they cause-leads  to efficient behav- 
ior. Suppose that each individual's expected  net accident costs under this 
rule, denoted  a, are $1,000. These  equal the cost of care, harm suffered, 
and damages paid, less  damages received. 
Compare this efficient legal rule to an inefficient one that redistributes 
income  from higher- to lower-income  individuals.  (Redistribution might 
be  accomplished,  for example,  by  setting damages  higher when  the  in- 
jurer is wealthy  and lower when the injurer is poor. Such a redistributive 
legal rule would be inefficient: it would induce the wealthy  to take more 
care and the poor to take less  care than is efficient.)  Let  us denote  the 
net expected  accident  costs-the  cost  of care, harm suffered,  and dam- 
ages  paid,  less  damages  received-individuals  bear under this  rule by 
a(y);  that is,  an individual's accident costs  are a function of his income, 
y. (Expected  accident costs  must be a function of income if the rule is to 
redistribute  income  relative  to  a rule under which  everyone's  accident 
costs  are the same.) 
In  particular,  suppose  that  relative  to  the  efficient  rule  the  poorest 
(those  with  income  of  $0) benefit  by  $500 and the  richest  (those  with 
income  of  $100,000)  lose  $1,000,  with  a linear relationship  in between. 
Figure  1 depicts  accident  costs  under this inefficient rule and also under 
the efficient  strict liability rule. Relative  to the efficient rule,  the ineffi- 670  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
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FIGURE 1 
cient  legal  rule redistributes  from those  with  incomes  over  $33,333  to 
those  with lower incomes. 
To  complete  the  description  of  the  regime  with  the  inefficient  rule, 
assume that there is an income tax with a rate of 20 percent. In particular, 
individuals pay tax on 20 percent of their income to the extent it exceeds 
$10,000; individuals with income under $10,000 receive transfer payments 
equaling 20 percent of the difference (so those earning no income receive 
$2,000).4 This  tax  system,  denoted  t,  is  illustrated by  the  solid  line  in 
Figure 2. 
In Figure 2,  we  also  show  a dashed line for t  +  a,  which  represents 
individuals' total payments under the tax system and on account of acci- 
dents  in the regime with the inefficient legal rule. It is this combination 
that determines  an individual's  welfare level  and work incentives.  With 
4 This may be familiar  to some readers  as a negative  income tax. It also is analogous  to 

















t: tax system with inefficient  rule 
t+a: tax system plus accident costs with inefficient rule 
FIGURE  2 
regard to the latter, we  emphasize  that when an individual with income 
y contemplates  earning additional income  by  working  harder, his  total 
marginal expected  payments  equal the sum of his marginal tax payment 
and the expected  marginal cost  on account of accidents.5 
Having described  the  regime under the inefficient  legal  rule,  we  will 
demonstrate that all individuals  can be made better off in a regime with 
the efficient  legal  rule and an altered income  tax  system.  Consider  the 
5 Of course, the extent to which individuals  accurately  perceive both their marginal  tax 
rate  and the amount  implicitly  taxed by the legal system is an empirical  question.  We think 
it plausible  that if the legal system redistributed  a significant  amount  of income, individuals 
would  take this into account. (After  all, individuals  often would  not need to understand  the 
effects of legal rules; rather,  they might simply observe, for example, the resulting  high 
prices of products  bought  disproportionately  by the rich.) If they misestimated  the extent 
of redistribution,  there is no compelling  reason to assume that their guesses would be too 
low rather  than too high. 672  THE  JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
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FIGURE  3 
modified income  tax depicted  in Figure 3. The solid line,  t +  a,  which 
represents individuals'  total payments  under the regime with the ineffi- 
cient legal rule, is copied  from Figure 2. The dashed line,  which  repre- 
sents the new income  tax, t,  is obtained by subtracting ad  (which,  recall, 
equals  $1,000  for all income  levels)  from the  line  t  +  a.  The  two  tax 
regimes are compared in Figure 4.6 
We can now describe individuals' behavior and welfare under the effi- 
cient legal  rule combined  with the  new  income  tax.  The total  effect  of 
the tax and accident costs is given by the sum t +  ad.  But, by construction, 
this expression  is identical to t +  a for any income level.  (After all, t is 
constructed  by  subtracting a from t  +  a.  When  a is  added back,  the 
result  must  equal  t  +  a.)  Thus,  individuals  who  earn  income  y  have 
6 The schedule t(y) is steeper than t(y)-that  is, more redistributive-by precisely the 
amount  by which a(y) is steeper than  d, as depicted  in Figure 1. EFFICIENCY  IN REDISTRIBUTION  673 
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FIGURE  4 
the same level  of welfare under each regime. Moreover,  each individual 
(whatever  his  ability) will  choose  to  earn the  same  income  under each 
regime because  his incentives  will be unchanged' a marginal dollar earned 
will result in the same incremental costs  (taxes plus accident costs)  under 
both regimes. 
Although work effort and an individual's after-tax welfare are identical 
under the  two  regimes,  the  state  collects  more tax revenue  in the  new 
regime because  it involves  a more efficient  legal rule.  To  see  why  this 
must be true, we first compare total available resources  in each regime. 
Because  individuals'  work effort is unaffected  by the new  regime,  total 
earnings will  be  the  same.  But the  inefficient  role by  definition wastes 
resources  relative to the efficient role, so total resources  must be greater 
under the  new  regime.  Yet  the new  income  tax leaves  individuals  with 
the  same income  as in the initial regime.  Thus,  it must be that the new 
tax collects  all the resources  saved by the efficient legal rule. Indeed,  the 
new tax was constructed  precisely  to produce this result. 674  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
To  illustrate,  consider  the  case  in which  individuals'  income  is  uni- 
formly distributed over  the range from $0 to  $100,000.  It is  straightfor- 
ward to calculate  that the per capita cost  of the inefficient legal rule is 
$250. The per capita revenue  under the original income tax,  t, is $8,000, 
and per capita revenue  under the modified income  tax,  t,-is  $8,250.  In- 
deed,  the  modified tax  collects  greater revenue  by  an amount that just 
equals the resources  wasted  by the inefficient legal rule. 
The conclusion  is that adopting the efficient legal rule, with an appro- 
priate change  in the  income  tax,  leaves  all individuals equally  well  off 
but leaves  the government  with a surplus. With this additional revenue, 
the  government  can  make  each  individual better  off  for  example,  by 
lowering taxes  (for the poor,  increasing transfers) by a fixed amount for 
each individual or spending the funds on a public good  that benefits  ev- 
eryone.7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
(a)  Factors  bearing on redistribution through legal rules.  In this arti- 
cle,  we  have  emphasized  that redistribution through legal  rules  is  less 
efficient than redistribution through the income tax. Other more familiar 
considerations  of  feasibility  and  accuracy  also  favor  redistribution 
through the income tax system.8 Specifically,  the income tax system  (in- 
cluding  transfer programs) can  redistribute from  all the  rich to  all the 
poor,9 whereas legal rules have substantially less redistributive potential. 
First, when parties are in a contractual relationship, it is well understood 
that redistribution usually  is not accomplished  because  prices  generally 
adjust to reflect the expected  cost of legal rules.1? Second,  when redistri- 
7 In practice,  redistribution  through  the income  tax rather  than  through  legal rules  would 
not literally  make everyone better off. Inevitably,  some would gain more than others and 
a few might  lose. Systematic  distributive  effects across income levels can be avoided by 
adjusting  the income  tax, which leaves the possibility  of sporadic  unequal  treatment  within 
income classes. There is, however, no reason  that such inequality  would be greater  when 
using the income tax rather  than legal rules to redistribute  income. For reasons noted in 
Section II(a) one might  expect legal rules to fare worse on this account. 
8 See, for example,  A. Mitchell  Polinsky,  An Introduction  to Law and  Economics  124-27 
(2d ed. 1989). 
9 Many exceptions, such as adjustments  for numbers  of dependents,  presumably  reflect 
aspects of distributional  policy. Others, such as those that result from tax evasion and 
welfare  fraud,  may  be addressed  in many  ways (increasing  enforcement,  augmenting  income 
taxes with luxury  taxes). It would be surprising,  however, if courts could more accurately 
determine  true income in, say, private  tort disputes than in tax evasion or welfare  fraud 
enforcement  proceedings. 
10  Contract  rules may affect distribution  if prices are also regulated,  but then the price 
regulation  itself may be used to accomplish  redistribution  among  such parties.  Also, there 
may  be some incidental  distributive  effects of contract  rules, such as when some individuals 
must expend resources  to opt out of default  rules that are suitable  for others. EFFICIENCY  IN REDISTRIBUTION  675 
bution is possible, it tends to be limited  to those few who become parties 
to lawsuits. And even then, redistribution  may be haphazard.  (A pro- 
plaintiff rule may be redistributive  if plaintiffs, on average, are poorer 
than defendants, but unless this is uniformly  true, the redistribution  will 
flow in the wrong direction in some cases.)11  The latter problem  can be 
avoided only if the legal rule depends directly on parties' incomes, a 
policy that few have proposed. Furthermore,  if one is prepared  to go 
that far, it becomes difficult to understand  why one would administer 
redistribution  in  such an ad hoc  and inefficient manner rather than 
through  the income tax system.12 
An argument  sometimes offered  in favor of redistribution  through  legal 
rules is that the tax system falls short  of optimal  redistributive  taxation- 
perhaps  because of the balance  of political  power in the legislature.  This 
argument  raises questions that we do not seek to address  about the func- 
tion of courts in a democracy. In any case, it seems unlikely that courts 
can accomplish  significant  redistribution  through  the legal system without 
attracting  the attention of legislators. Also, much legal reform  presently 
under consideration,  such as tort reform, is in the jurisdiction  of legisla- 
tures. 
These points, combined  with this article's  efficiency  argument,  suggest 
that normative  economic analysis of legal rules should be primarily  con- 
cerned with efficiency rather  than the distribution  of income. Nonethe- 
less, analyzing  distribution  may be important,  because those formulating 
income tax policy need to be aware of any significant  distributive  effects 
of legal rules that  would not otherwise  be apparent,  such as from studying 
information  on the actual distribution  of income. Distributive  effects, of 
course, are identified  by economic analysis that examines the costs and 
benefits  of legal rules-the  same sort of analysis  used to determine  which 
rules are efficient. 
(b) Is it ever efficient  for legal rules to take account of parties' 
wealth?  We have argued  that it is inefficient  for legal rules to take into 
account parties'  wealth in order  to redistribute  income. We now consider 
whether there may be other reasons for legal rules to depend on parties' 
wealth. 
Because the poor are more risk-averse  than the rich, the efficient  allo- 
n Even when a party  appears  to be rich, the redistributive  effect may be more limited. 
For example, when corporations  pay more for injuries  to third  parties, consumer  prices 
and wages will be affected. 
12 Thus, although  we did not consider the possible additional  administrative  costs of 
increasing  the amount  of redistribution  through  the income  tax, it seems plausible  that  these 
costs would be less than  those of achieving  significant,  well-targeted  redistribution  through 
legal rules. 676  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
cation  of risk might appear to justify  taking wealth  into account  in the 
design of legal rules. For example,  poor injurers might be assessed  lower 
damages,  the  law's  generosity  providing  them  implicit  partial liability 
insurance.  Yet,  if liability insurance is available in the marketplace,  it is 
inefficient  to  adjust damages  to  reflect  risk aversion.'3  Insurance  pur- 
chases  will  provide  the  optimal degree  of  risk mitigation; furthermore, 
imposition of damages fully equal to harm is necessary  to induce potential 
injurers and their insurers to take complete  account  of harm that might 
be caused.  Thus,  any adjustment in legal rules due to parties' risk aver- 
sion,  as  evidenced  by  their  wealth,  must  be  premised  on  a  failure  in 
insurance markets.'4 
Nevertheless,  it often  is  efficient  for damages  to  reflect  the  victim's 
income.  When an injury involves  lost future earnings, the level  of earn- 
ings indicates  the extent  of economic  loss.15 In addition,  under a negli- 
gence rule,  sometimes  it is efficient for the  standard of  care to  depend 
on parties' income.  To illustrate, suppose  that a precaution that reduces 
expected  accident  costs  by $15 takes  an hour of effort.  This precaution 
would be  efficient  for  individuals  who  can otherwise  earn only  $10 an 
hour but not for those  whose  opportunity cost  is $20 an hour.16 
13  This is demonstrated  in Steven Shavell, On Liability  and Insurance,  13 Bell J. Econ. 
120  (1982). 
14  Jennifer  Arlen, supra note 3, argues that, when parties  are risk-averse,  their wealth 
should  affect the level of liability-even  in the presence of perfect  insurance  markets  and 
complete  insurance.  Her result  derives  from  the assumption  that the rich value wealth  less 
at  the margin  than  the poor (which  is formally  equivalent  to the assumption  that individuals 
are risk-averse).  Therefore,  social welfare  is advanced  by using  the legal system to transfer 
wealth  from the rich to the poor; in her model, this is accomplished  by imposing  higher 
liability  on the rich. Yet she describes  the social desirability  of higher  liability  on the rich 
as  an aspect of optimal  deterrence,  not as the masked  transfer  of wealth  that it is. In fact, 
a  complete analysis of her model would lead to the conclusion  that the socially ideal out- 
come  involves damages  that  fully equalize  the wealth  of the victim  and the injurer.  Indeed, 
if  the victim were rich, he would pay "damages"  to the injurer!  Obviously,  it would not 
be socially desirable to take parties' wealth into account in the manner  Arlen suggests 
unless  the income tax were unavailable  for redistributive  purposes.  For further  discussion 
of  Arlen's article, see Thomas  J. Miceli  & Kathleen  Segerson,  Defining  Efficient  Care:  The 
Role  of Income Redistribution,  24 J. Legal Stud. (1995,  in press). 
15  The argument  assumes that injurers  have some advance knowledge  of the economic 
loss  they might cause.  If  they knew only average losses for all victims, a rule providing 
that  damages  equal average  harm  would be equally  efficient.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell,  Accuracy  in the Assessment of Damages  (Working  Paper  No. 4287, National  Bu- 
reau  of Economic Research 1993). 
16  An implicit  assumption  in this argument  is that  it is not possible  simply  to hire  someone 
else  to undertake  the precaution.  Also, note that under  a rule of strict liability,  damages 
should  equal $15 rather  than assessing higher  damages  on the rich in order  to induce  them 
to  take the same care that others take. 677  EFFICIENCY  IN REDISTRIBUTION 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Redistribution is accomplished  more efficiently through the income tax 
system than through the use of legal rules, even when redistributive taxes 
distort behavior.  Redistribution through legal rules causes  the same inef- 
ficiency  as taxes  with regard to the labor-leisure choice:  the distortion is 
caused  by the redistribution itself and is not particular to the mechanism 
by which it is accomplished.  And when redistribution involves  choosing 
less  efficient  legal  rules,  additional  costs  are incurred.  This  argument, 
along with  others  that are more familiar, suggests  that it is appropriate 
for economic  analysis  of legal rules to focus  on efficiency  and to ignore 
the distribution of income  in offering normative judgments.'7 
APPENDIX 
FORMAL  PROOF  AND  REMARKS 
The  model  parallels  the  illustration in Section  I.  Individuals  exercise  care  x 
and cause accidents with probability p(x), with p' < O,  p" >  0. An accident causes 
harm of h, which  is borne equally by all individuals.18 Individuals differ in their 
ability  a  to  earn  income  y  through labor  effort  ~,  where  y(cx) =  at  and  (for 
notational  simplicity) cx  is distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1]. Individuals 
who  cause  accidents  pay damages of d. The income  tax schedule  is t(y). 
We begin with an inefficient legal rule in which damages are d(yx, Yv), where 
YI is the  injurer's income  and Yv is the victim's  income.  (Allowing  damages  to 
depend  on  parties'  incomes  makes  redistribution  possible.)  Each  individual 
chooses  labor effort, e,  and care, x, to maximize expected  utility, which is 
EU  = y -  e -  t(y)  -  x -  ph -  p(x) J  d(y, yv(a))dt  ( 
+  lp(x(yi(ot)))d(yi(c),y)da, 
where p is the average probability that others will cause a person harm and where, 
recall,  y  =  c?.  The  first four terms  on the right side  are income,  work  effort, 
income  tax payments,  and care. Next,  utility is reduced by the expected  harm a 
person  suffers,  ph.  The final two  terms represent payments  made and received 
under the legal rule. Payments are made when a person causes an accident,  which 
has probability p(x); damages, in turn, depend on a person's own income, y (when 
one is the injurer), and each possible  victim's income (yv(a)  is the income earned 
by the type of individual who has ability (x)-the  integral measures the total over 
17  Conventional  efficiency analysis of legal rules that abstracts  from the distribution  of 
income typically will yield the same result as an analysis that fully incorporates  both the 
distributive  effects of legal rules and adjustments  to the income tax system. The conven- 
tional approach,  however, is preferable  on grounds  of simplicity. 
18  Alternatively,  it could be assumed  that  each individual  bears  harm  with equal  probabil- 
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all possible victims. Payments are received when one is injured;  each type of 
individual  causes an accident with probability  p(x(yi(a))) and pays damages  re- 
flecting his income-the  integral measures the sum over all types who might 
injure  a person.19 
We now compare  this regime  to one with an efficient  legal rule and a modified 
income tax system. The efficient rule is d =  h; as is well known, under strict 
liability  when injurers  pay damages  equal to harm  caused, all costs are internal- 
ized, so actors are induced to take the level of care that minimizes  the sum of 
the cost of care and expected harm. We denote this efficient  level of care as x 
and observe that it is independent  of one's income level. It will be useful to 
denote the inefficiency  caused by the damages  rule d(yi, Yv) by 
~r  =  [x(y(a)) + p(x(y(a)))h] -  [X  + p(X)h]i da.  (A2) 
Jo 
Because the damage  rule d is inefficient,  xr  is positive. (The integrand  is posi- 
tive whenever x(y(a)) is unequal  to efficient  care~x.)20 
In the regime with the efficient  damages  rule d =  h, let the modified  income 
tax be 
t(y) = t(y) +  x(y) + ph + p(x(y))  d(y, yv(a))da 
i  i  r  ~~~~~~~~~(A3) 
-  fJ p(x(yi(oO)))d(y(a),  y)dt\] 
-  [x  + p(X)h  ]. 
Note that, as in Section I, the new income tax, t(y), is constructed  by beginning 
with the initial income tax, t(y), adding total accident costs under the initial, 
inefficient  regime  and subtracting  total accident  costs under  the efficient  regime. 
The former  total (under  the inefficient  rule) is the first  term  in large  brackets:  the 
cost of care, harm suffered, and expected damage payments, minus expected 
damage  awards  received. The latter (under  the efficient  rule) is the second term 
in large  brackets:  the cost of care and expected damage  payments  (harm  suffered 
is precisely offset by expected damage  awards  received). As a result of the first 
adjustment,  the new income tax changes with income in exactly the way that 
accident-related  costs did under the inefficient liability rule. Thus, if higher- 
income individuals  paid more in damages,  now they pay more in taxes instead. 
We next demonstrate  that the expected utility of individuals  will be the same 
under  the new tax t(y) and the efficient  legal rule as it is under  the initial  income 
tax and the inefficient  rule. Recall that, under  the efficient  legal rule, all individu- 
als (regardless  of income) choose the same level of care, x. Also, as just noted, 
expected harm suffered is just offset by expected damage  awards received be- 
cause damages  equal harm. Hence, in the new regime, individuals  choose labor 
effort ? to maximize  expected utility, which is 
19  The last four terms together  correspond  to the expression  a(y) in the notation  of Sec- 
tion I. 
20  In particular,  whenever  the damage  rule d results in an expected payment  exceeding 
h (as it would when injurers  are relatively  wealthy, if the rule is redistributive  in a manner 
that favors the poor), injurers  will take excessive care. Similarly,  when the damage  rule d 
results in an expected payment  less than h (as when injurers  are relatively  poor), injurers 
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EU  = y  -  e -  t(y)  -  x -  p(x)h.  (A4) 
If one  uses  (A3) to  substitute  for t(y)  in (A4) and compares  the result to  (A1), 
the  expression  for expected  utility in the initial regime,  it is  apparent that,  for 
any income  level y, 
EU =  EU.  (A5) 
Because  expected  utility is the same for any level  of labor effort, e,  individuals 
of any given  ability will choose  the same labor effort under both regimes.  This, 
in turn, implies that their welfare will be identical under both regimes. 
Finally,  we show that tax revenues  are greater under the modified income tax. 
In particular, 
|1  (y(a)) da  =  t(y(a))dct+  *r.  (A6) 
o  Jo 
This follows  directly from the definitions of t(y) in (A3) and ,r in (A2). After all, 
t(y) is constructed  to equal t(y),  plus the total accident costs under the inefficient 
rule minus the total accident  costs  under the efficient rule. And Tr  is defined to 
equal just  this  difference  in  accident  costs.  (The  only  difference  between  the 
bracketed expressions  in [A3] and the right side of [A2] is that the former includes 
terms for damages individuals pay and receive.  But when one integrates over all 
individuals,  the total of damages paid and received  are equal,  so these  compo- 
nents are precisely  offsetting.) 
One can define a new tax by t(y)-~r.  (That is, the savings in accident costs  are 
uniformly rebated,  in a lump-sum manner, to the entire population.)  Under this 
tax, labor effort will be unchanged (since the tax differs from t(y) by a constant),21 
so revenues  will now be the same as under the initial tax,  t(y).  Each individual 
is better off by ~r. 
Remarks.  (a)  Generality  of  the result.  It should be  apparent that our result 
does not depend on the nature of the activity (for example,  one could incorporate 
victim care), the form of the legal rule, the income tax system,22 or the distribution 
of  ability.  The  result  might appear  to  depend  on  some  features  of  the  utility 
function-notably,  risk  neutrality,  the  lack  of  income  effects,  and  care  being 
independent  of ability. Relaxing these assumptions would make determination of 
the  efficient  legal  rule  more  complicated.  It would  remain true,  however,  that 
if the redistribution  accomplished  through an inefficient legal rule were  instead 
achieved  through a modification of the tax system,  resources would be saved and 
all individuals could be made better off. 
(b)  Excise taxes versus legal rules as redistributive devices.  Reasoning similar 
to that in our article suggests  the superiority of excise  taxes  over  legal rules as 
21 The utility  function  (A1) involves no income effects; if there were income effects, the 
argument  would hold except that the amount  of rebate  that would restore budget  balance 
would be less than rr. 
22  For convenience, we examine the distribution  of income with an income tax as the 
redistributive  tool. In a dynamic  analysis, one might  wish to distinguish  the distribution  of 
consumption  or wealth  from  the distribution  of income  (and  consider  consumption  or wealth 
taxes in addition  to an income tax), which would raise the issue of distorting  savings. One 
can think of the labor-leisure  distortion  as exemplifying  any distortion  that results from a 
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redistributive  tools.  Suppose,  for example,  that there is an inefficient legal rule 
that requires  excessive  care  by  owners  of  yachts.  Moreover,  assume  that this 
rule has desirable distributive features because yacht owners are usually wealthier 
than those  injured by yachts.  The inefficiency  caused by this rule will have three 
components:  excessive  care is by definition more costly than the harm prevented; 
yachting  is made more expensive,  which  distorts choices  between  yachting  and 
other  activities  (for example,  playing golf);  and income  buys  less  for the  rich, 
which distorts their labor-leisure choices. 
Consider the alternative of using an efficient legal rule combined with an appro- 
priate excise  tax on yachting,  the proceeds  to be distributed to low-income  indi- 
viduals (perhaps the victims of yachting accidents).  Distortions  of the amount of 
yachting and labor-leisure decisions  would remain the same: the rich would pay 
more  on  account  of  the  excise  tax  rather than  on  account  of  bearing  higher 
accident  costs  (the sum of prevention  costs  and expected  liability payments).23 
But the first inefficiency,  excessive  care, would be avoided.  Thus, the excise  tax 
would allow more efficient redistribution than the legal rule. 
Observe,  however,  that an excise  tax is a less  efficient means of redistribution 
than  the  income  tax,  because  the  excise  tax  distorts  the  amount  of  yachting 
whereas  the income  tax does  not.24 Thus,  if one wishes  to redistribute income, 
the most efficient choice typically will be the income tax, the second choice would 
be an excise  tax  (as with luxury taxes),  and the worst  alternative  would  be  an 
inefficient legal rule with desirable distributive consequences. 
(c)  Qualifications  and  the  relationship  between  our  result  and  those  in  the 
literature  on  optimal  taxation.  Our result  is  analogous  to  results  on  optimal 
taxation.  In  simple  cases,  specific  commodity  excises  are  inefficient  in  the 
presence  of  an optimal  income  tax.25 This  conclusion  does  not  hold  generally, 
however,  because  taxes  or  subsidies  on  particular  commodities  might  have 
23  Analogous  to the effects of excise taxes are subsidies  for particular  purchases.  The 
familiar  argument  is that in-kind  welfare  assistance  (for example,  free housing  rather  than 
cash of equal market  value) is inefficient  because it distorts  choices such as that between 
housing and food purchases, in addition  to creating  potential  work disincentives  for the 
poor that would result from cash assistance as well. Although  one might  justify in-kind 
welfare programs  on other grounds-for  example, because we paternalistically  wish to 
force the poor to spend on food and housing-it  is difficult  to apply such arguments  in the 
context of redistribution  through  legal rules. (We would  not channel  redistribution  through 
a tort rule because we wished the poor to be in more accidents  caused by the rich.) 
24  Under the Ramsey  tax rule, the efficiency  of such an excise tax would depend  on the 
elasticity of demand  for yachting.  But, as explained  in the following  remark  and note 25, 
this analysis  is inapplicable  in the presence  of an income  tax. An excise tax, however, may 
be superior  if the amount  of yachting  were excessive, as it might  be under a negligence 
rule. See Steven Shavell, Strict  Liability  versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). 
25  For a useful survey of the literature  and discussion of the ideas presented in this 
remark,  see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient  and Optimal  Taxation  and the New New 
Welfare  Economics, in 2 Handbook  of Public  Economics  991, 1023-27  (Alan J. Auerbach 
& Martin  Feldstein  eds. 1987).  The survey  explains  why the familiar  Ramsey  tax rule-that 
tax rates on commodities  should vary inversely with demand  elasticities-is  inapplicable 
in the presence of an income tax. (When  an income tax is present, one can raise revenue 
without  causing  any distortion  in choices among  commodities.  Hence, differential  taxation 
of commodities  is only useful when it reduces the labor-leisure  distortion,  as explained  in 
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indirect effects that reduce the distortion of an income tax. In particular,  by 
taxing  complements  of leisure and by subsidizing  substitutes,  one can reduce the 
labor-leisure  distortion  and  thereby  improve  welfare  by more  than  the inefficiency 
that results from distorted  purchases  of the taxed or subsidized  commodities. 
Analogously, if there were legal disputes involving  activities that were strong 
complements  of or substitutes  for leisure, one might select rules that provided 
additional  penalties or subsidies relative  to what an efficient  rule would involve. 
(As the excise tax discussion suggests, however, this would be the most efficient 
choice only if taxes or subsidies on the activities themselves were infeasible.) 
Such penalties and subsidies, however, are not conventionally redistributive: 
whether  an activity should  be penalized  or subsidized  depends  on how the activity 
affects  the labor-leisure  choice, not on whether  it is undertaken  disproportionately 
by the rich. Thus, although  a complete  and  sophisticated  analysis  does not demon- 
strate that it could never be efficient  to change legal rules from what narrowly 
seem to be the most efficient  ones, there is no general  argument  for adjustments 
of a conventionally  redistributive  type.26 
26  For discussion of other qualifications,  see Kaplow, supra  note 3. 